


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YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Yugoslavia is giving internal publicity to the claims of Croat emigre separatists that they have Soviet support for their efforts to break up the Yugoslav federation.

According to a Yugoslav Press Agency newsletter intended for top Yugoslav officials, emigre Croat leader Branko Jelic recently told a rally of Croatian emigres in West Germany that "we have been told by the Russians that they support a free, independent, and nonaligned Croatia." There is, however, no evidence to support Jelic's assertion, although some of the more radical emigres reportedly turned to the Soviets earlier this year, presumably because they were frustrated by their failure to get support from the West. They will nonetheless continue to seek help in the West, particularly in the US.

With publication of the Belgrade newsletter article, the Yugoslavs for the first time have explicitly linked Moscow with the Croat separatists. The article was followed by a public radiobroadcast from Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, accusing the Poles and the Soviets of meddling in Yugoslav affairs. On 22 April, a noted Yugoslav commentator took strong exception to an article in a Polish trade union journal which asserted that Croat separatists are growing stronger both inside and outside Yugoslavia. The commentator also attacked the Soviets for being behind the Polish move and for apparently calling into question at the recent Soviet 24th party congress the viability of Yugoslavia as a state.

Now that the issue is out in the open, Yugoslav-Soviet relations can be expected to be affected by it in proportion to the success of emigre terrorism and propaganda activities. In addition, Belgrade will intensify its search in Yugoslavia for supporters of Croat separatism.

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
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CAMBODIA: Efforts to form a new government in Phnom Penh remain stalled. The main obstacle is Sirik Matak's reluctance to accept a position in a troika of deputy prime ministers.

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Lon Nol may yet be able to persuade Matak to go along. Lon Nol still favors the plan and believes he can convince Matak that he will be the senior deputy premier.

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
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
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


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TANZANIA: The Zanzibar Revolutionary Council (REVCO) is pressing for major changes in the constitution that binds the island and mainland governments together in a loose union. The REVCO proposals would drastically curtail President Nyerere's powers as well as increase the council's own influence in union and mainland affairs. Although Nyerere is extremely unlikely to accept the proposals, he has not yet rejected them and is probably trying to handle the volatile REVCO carefully to avoid a blowup. Unless he can find some way to sidestep the REVCO, however, he may have to give in to at least some of the Zanzibaris' demands for greater financial control over union operations on the island.

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